Interpretation

Antenuptial Agreements Construed Like Contracts Because They Are

Having a contract is one thing. Defining what is meant by certain terms is another. Antenuptial agreements are contracts and generally the law of contracts applies to their interpretation and application. Fletcher v. Fletcher (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 464 at 466, 628 N.E.2d 1343 citing to 2 Williston on Contracts (3 Ed.1959), Section 270B.

Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that antenuptial agreements constitute a special type of contract to which certain special rules apply. See Gross, supra. An agreement to marry gives rise to a confidential relationship between the parties. Fletcher at 467.

II. Ambiguities in Antenuptial Contracts

Contracts are to be construed so as to discover and effectuate the intent of the parties. TRINOVA Corp. v. Pilkington Bros. P.L.C. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 271, 276, 638 N.E.2d 572; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hussey (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 640, 644, 590 N.E.2d 724; Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co. (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374 at paragraph one of the syllabus.

It is presumed that the intent of the parties to a contract resides in the language they chose to employ therein. Kelly v. Med. Life Ins. Co. (1987), 31 Ohio St. 3d 130, 509 N.E.2d 411 at paragraph one of the syllabus. A court should interpret a contract to carry out the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the contract. Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co. (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374, paragraph one of the syllabus.

However, when the language of a contract is unclear or ambiguous, or when the circumstances surrounding the agreement invest the language of the contract with a special meaning, extrinsic evidence may be considered to give effect to the parties intentions. Kelly, supra at 132; Shifrin v. Forest City Ent. Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 638, 597 N.E.2d 499. These principles are just as applicable in the construction of an antenuptial agreement as they are in the construction of any other contract. Vadakin v. Vadakin, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2602 (June 11, 1997) Washington Co. App. No. No. 95CA49 citing 3 Lindey on Separation Agreements and Antenuptial Contracts (1996) 90-133 to 90-134, section 90.14(A).

Common words appearing in a contract are generally given their ordinary meaning. Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 241, 374 N.E.2d 146 at paragraph paragraph two of the syllabus; Sanitary Commercial Services, Inc. v. Shank (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 178, 182, 566 N.E.2d 1215; King v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1988), 35 Ohio St. 3d 208, 212, 519 N.E.2d 1380. This basic tenet is just as applicable in the construction of an antenuptial agreement. Vadakin v. Vadakin, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2602 (June 11, 1997) Washington Co. App. No. No. 95CA49 citing See 3 Lindey on Separation Agreements and Antenuptial Contracts, supra at 90-134, section 90.14(A).